CORPORATIONS-OFFICERs

AND DMECTORS-FIcUREHEAD DIRECToR

LIABLE FOR Co-DIRECTOR'S MISAPPROPRIATION OF

FuNDs-Francis

v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981).

The trend in corporate director liability cases has been to find
negligent directors not liable for corporate losses.' Analysis has generally focused on whether a director's breach of his fiduciary duty to
the corporation was the proximate cause of the losses. 2 A recent New

Jersey Supreme Court case which may reverse this trend is Francisv.
United Jersey Bank. 3 In Francis,Lillian Pritchard was a director and
majority shareholder of Pritchard and Baird, 4 a closely-held corporation doing business as a reinsurance broker. 5 The company had four
directors, Charles Pritchard, Sr., his wife, Lillian, and their sons,
Charles, Jr. and William.6 Charles, Sr. died in 1973, 7 but before his
death, he started taking "loans" from corporate funds for his personal
use, a practice that eventually led to the corporation's dissolution. 8

Taking these loans was possible because of the unique nature of the
reinsurance industry.'

I

Goldstein & Shepherd, Directors' Duties and Liabilities Under the Securities Acts and
CorporationLaw, 36 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 759, 781 n.163 (1979); see notes 69 & 117 infra and
accompanying text.
' Dyson, The Director's Liability for Negligence, 40 IND. L.J. 341, 358-67 (1965).
3 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981).
4 Id. at 23, 432 A.2d at 818. Although Pritchard and Baird initially operated as a partnership, it later formed several corporations: Pritchard and Baird Intermediaries Corp., Pritchard
and Baird, Inc., P & B Intermediaries Corp., and P & B Inc. Brief for Appellant at 2, Francis v.
United Jersey Bank, 171 N.J. Super. 34, 407 A.2d 1253 (App. Div. 1979). The court considered
the activities of only one entity, Pritchard and Baird Intermediaries Corp., since proofs in
support of prior judgments related only to that corporation.
87 N.J. at 22, 432 A.2d at 817. Black's Law Dictionary defines reinsurance as:
A contract by which an insurer procures a third person to insure him against loss or
liability by reason of original insurance. A contract that one insurer makes with
another to protect the latter from a risk already assumed. It binds the reinsurer to
pay to the reinsured the whole loss sustained in respect to the subject of the insurance
to the extent to which he is reinsured.
BLAcK's LAW DIcriONARY 1157 (5th ed. 1979).
1 87 N.J. at 23, 432 A.2d at 818. George and Marjorie Baird were part of the original group
of directors, but they eventually sold their shares to the Pritchards. Id.
7 Id. Lillian Pritchard inherited the bulk of her husband's estate, including his share in the
corporation, thus, becoming the largest shareholder. Id.
Under the guise of shareholder loans, Charles, Sr. withdrew funds as compensation for
unpaid salaries and commissions. During his reign, however, these "loans" were repaid out of
corporate profits at the end of each fiscal year. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 162 N.J. Super.
355, 362-63, 392 A.2d 1233, 1237 (Law Div. 1978), affd, 171 N.J. Super. 34, 407 A.2d 1253
(App. Div. 1979), aff'd, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981).
' 87 N.J. at 24, 432 A.2d at 818.
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Reinsurance is a method of spreading the risk among several
insurance companies. One insurer may wish to protect itself on a large
policy by selling a part of the underlying risk to other insurance
companies, thereby reinsuring itself. 10 A reinsurance broker acts as
an intermediary, arranging transactions between the companies."

The procedure for payment is that the insurance company wishing to
spread the risk sends the premium to the broker who deducts his
brokerage fee and forwards the balance to the various companies
sharing the risk.' 2 When a loss occurs, funds are transferred in re3
verse order.'
Although the accepted practice of the industry is to separate
insurance funds from those of the broker's general accounts, Pritchard
and Baird maintained only one account.' 4 By doing so, Charles, Sr.,
was able to make payments to himself from the insurance funds, and
repay them at the end of the year out of corporate profits. 15 By 1971,
when Charles, Sr. had ceased his active involvement in the company,
Charles, Jr. and William not only continued this method of operating,
but also began to take increasing amounts from the corporation which
they were unable to repay.' 6 By 1975 the payments exceeded the
corporate revenues to such an extent that the corporation went bankrupt. 17 The trustees in bankruptcy' sued the director sons for the
10Id. at 22-23, 432 A.2d at 817-18. The various insurance companies do not communicate
with each other; they rely solely on the integrity and honesty of the reinsurance broker to
forward funds when they become due. Id. at 22, 432 A.2d at 817. Also, the reinsurance industry
is not regulated by the government. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 162 N.J. Super. 355, 361, 392
A.2d 1233, 1236 (Law Div. 1978), aJJ'd, 171 N.J. Super. 34, 407 A.2d 1253 (App. Div. 1979),
afJ'd, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981). All these factors combine to make the business of
reinsurance unique in that the broker has unilateral, unchecked control over large sums of money
belonging to others. Id.
11 87 N.J. at 22, 432 A.2d at 817.
12 Id.
13 Brief for Appellee at 13, Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 171 N.J. Super. 34, 407 A.2d 1253
(App. Div. 1979).
14 87 N.J. at 23-24, 432 A.2d at 818-19.
15 Id. at 24, 432 A.2d at 818.
16 Id. At the end of 1970, William had withdrawn $207,329 in cash, and Charles, Jr.,
$230,932. These amounts were in addition to salary or any other legal earnings or profits. Other
family members benefitted from the loans. Charles, Sr. received $189,194.17 from 1970 to 1973.
Loans to Lillian Pritchard from 1973 to 1975 totalled $33,000. Lillian Overcash, Mrs. Pritchard's daughter, received $123,156.51 from 1970 to 1975. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 162
N.J. Super. 355, 364, 392 A.2d 1233, 1237-38 (Law Div. 1978), aJfd. 171 N.J. Super. 34, 407
A.2d 1253 (App. Div. 1979), aJf'd, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981).
17 87 N.J. at 24, 432 A.2d at 818. By 1975, the loans amounted to a total of $12,333,514.47.
Pritchard and Baird filed for bankruptcy on December 4, 1975, and it was adjudicated bankrupt
on January 28, 1976. Brief for Appellee at 7-8, Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 171 N.J. Super.
34, 407 A.2d 1253 (App. Div. 1979). Separate bankruptcy proceedings are being litigated against
Charles, Jr. and William. 87 N.J. at 21, 432 A.2d at 816.
18 Plaintiffs John J. Francis, George R. Ladner (later substituted by Hugh P. Francis) and J.
Raymond Berry were trustees in bankruptcy for all four of the Pritchard and Baird companies.
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losses, as well as the estate of Mrs. Pritchard, although she never
actively participated in these transactions or any form of corporate
decision-making. '9
The trial court held that the payments constituted fraudulent
conveyances under state law.2 0 Furthermore, in failing to discover
and prevent her sons' wrongdoing, Mrs. Pritchard was found liable
because her negligence caused the creditors and customers of Pritchard and Baird to suffer monetary losses. 21 The court entered judgment against her estate in the amount of $10,355,736.91 plus inter-

est.

22

The appellate division affirmed as to Mrs. Pritchard's liability,
but disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of the payments as
fraudulent conveyances. 23 In a per curiam opinion, the court characThey filed their complaint on April 26, 1976 against Charles, Jr., Lillian Pritchard, Lillian
Overcash, Deborah and William Pritchard (children of Lillian Overeash), individually, and
Charles, Jr., and William and Lillian Pritchard as executors of Charles, Sr.'s estate. Brief for
Appellee at 203, Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 171 N.J. Super. 34, 407 A.2d 1253 (App. Div.
1979). United Jersey Bank was joined as administrator of Charles, Sr.'s estate (replacing Charles,
Jr., William, and Lillian). 87 N.J. at 20, 432 A.2d at 816.
Lillian Pritchard died after commencement of the initial suit. As executrix of her mother's
estate, Lillian Overeash was substituted as defendant. Lillian Overcash was thus liable in two
capacities: as executrix and as an individual. Id.
"1 87 N.J. at 26, 432 A.2d at 820. The trustees later terminated their suit in state court
against Charles, Jr. and William since they had declared bankruptcy and remedies were being
sought during their bankruptcy proceedings. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 162 N.J. Super. 355,
365, 392 A.2d 1233, 1238 (Law Div. 1978), aJy'd, 171 N.J. Super. 34, 407 A.2d 1253 (App. Div.
1979), affd, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981). In a prior action, the trustees obtained an
indictment by the state grand jury against Charles, Jr. and William for misappropriation of
corporate funds under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 102-3 (West 1969) and as to Charles, Jr., embezzlement under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:102-5 (West 1969). State v. Pritchard, 79 N.J. 462, 401 A.2d
219 (1978).
O N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:2-10 (West 1940); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 162 N.J. Super.
355, 367 (Law Div. 1978), aff'd, 171 N.J. Super. 34, 407 A.2d 1253 (App. Div. 1979), aff'd, 87
N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981). The provision governing fraudulent conveyances states: "Every
conveyance made and every obligation incurred by a person who is or will be thereby rendered
insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors without regard to his actual intent if the conveyance is
made or the obligation is incurred without fair consideration." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:2-10. The
court also found that Charles, Jr. and William had an intent to defraud. 162 N.J. Super. at 367,
392 A.2d at 1239. As a result of these findings, the Pritchard and Baird creditors were entitled to
the amount of the payments made to members of the Pritchard family. Thus, since the trustees in
bankruptcy represented the creditors, they had a right to a money judgment against respondents.
Id. at 368, 392 A.2d at 1239.
2, Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 162 N.J. Super. 355, 374, 392 A.2d 1233, 1242 (Law Div.
1978), aff'd, 171 N.J. Super. 34, 407 A.2d 1253 (App. Div. 1979), aff'd, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814
(1981).
2- Id. The trial court held Charles, Sr.'s estate liable in the amount of $357,648.17 plus
prejudgment interest of $86,297.00, for a total of $443,945.17. Lillian Overcash individually was
held liable for $123,156.51 plus interest of $34,573.47, for a total of $157,729.98. Brief for
Appellee at 4-5, Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 171 N.J. Super. 34, 407 A.2d 1253 (App. Div.
1979).
" Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 171 N.J. Super. 35, 35-36, 407 A.2d 1253, 1254 (App. Div.
1979), af-'d. 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981).
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terized the payments as an unlawful conversion of trust funds, 24 and
noted that the result would be the same regardless of the analysis
25
employed.
The supreme court agreed with the appellate division's classification of the payments as trust funds, and granted certification solely to
the issue of Mrs. Pritchard's liability. 26 Its inquiry was limited to
"whether a corporate director is personally liable in negligence for the

failure to prevent the misappropriation of trust funds by other directors who were also officers and shareholders of the corporation." 2 7 In
Francis, the supreme court affirmed the l6wer courts' opinions and
held that Mrs. Pritchard's negligence as a director was the proximate
cause of plaintiffs' losses caused by the misappropriation of funds by
28
her sons.
Historically, many of the earliest cases discussing director liability involved banks, savings institutions, and trust companies. 29 In the
1872 case of Spering's Appeal, 30 directors of an insurance and trust
company 3' were sued for the losses incurred by "fraudulent mismanagement" of company affairs. 32 In ascertaining a director's responsi-

bilities to his stockholders, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated
that directors are only trustees in the sense that they are bailees or
agents assigned to the task of managing another's property. 33 Consequently, they are "regarded as mandatories"-"persons who have
24 87 N.J. at 21, 432 A.2d at 817.

2 Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 171 N.J. Super. 35, 36, 407 A.2d 1253, 1254 (App. Div.
1979), aJJ'd, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981).
26 Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 82 N.J. 285, 412 A.2d 791 (1980).
' 87 N.J. at 20, 432 A.2d at 817.
2 Id. at 45, 432 A.2d at 829.
29 E.g., Preston v. Prather, 137 U.S. 694 (1890) (directors of bank liable for gross negligence
for failure to supervise dishonest cashier); LaMonte v. Mott, 93 N.J. Eq. 229, 107 A. 462 (1921)
(directors of trust company held liable for negligently conducting business); Williams v.McKay,
46 N.J. Eq. 25, 18 A. 824 (Ch. 1889) (managers of savings bank held liable for failure to
reasonably supervise officers of bank according to its charters); Wilkinson v. Dodd, 42 N.J. Eq.
234, 7 A. 327 (Ch. 1886), ajfJ'd, 42 N.J. Eq. 647, 9 A. 685 (1887) (managers of savings institution
held liable for losses from illegal loans); Kavanaugh v. Gould, 223 N.Y. 103, 119 N.E. 237 (1918)
(director of trust company who was not knowledgeable in company's affairs and did nothing as
to his directorial duties cannot be held negligent as matter of law). See generally Lewis, The
Business Judgment Rule and Corporate Directors'Liability for Mismanagement, 22 BAYLOn L.
REv. 157, 163 (1970).
30 71 Pa. 11 (1872).
'" The company was originally involved in life insurance and the savings fund business; after
1850, the life insurance aspect of the business was transferred and the savings fund became the
primary business of the company. Id. at 12. Thus, the opinion is analyzed with the bank cases.
32 Id. The alleged impropriety by the company's directors occurred over a period of ten years
and involved such incidents as wasteful investments, over-valuation of assets to show profits, and
not enforcing unpaid stock subscriptions. Id. at 13.
3 Id. at 20-21.
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gratuitously undertaken to perform certain duties, and who are there34
fore bound to apply ordinary skill and diligence, but no more."The Spering's Appeal court noted that prior case law characterized three situations where directors may be held accountable for their
actions: first, when they have personally perpetrated fraud on the
corporation; second, when they have known or colluded in perpetrating the deception in others; and third, when the wrongdoing may
have been forestalled if they had performed their duties with ordinary
diligence.3 5 None of these situations were applicable to the directors
in Spering's Appeal, however, because they had merely invested unwisely.36 The court asserted that directors should not be held liable
for "mistakes of judgment. '37 This concept has come to be known as
38
the "business judgment rule.
In the same spirit as Spering's Appeal, the United States Supreme
Court in Briggs v. Spaulding39 exonerated four bank directors when
34

Id.

3- Id.
10

Id. at 20.

" Id. at 24.
3' Dyson, supra note

2, at 367-71. The business judgment rule is employed as a defense by
directors under which liability cannot be imposed for mere faulty judgment. Id. at 367. Dyson
refers to the business judgment rule as a "weakened negligence doctrine." Id. at 368. The rule is
succinctly summarized by Judge Sharswood in this often-quoted passage:
[W]hile directors are personally responsible to the stockholders for any losses resulting from fraud, embezzlement or willful misconduct or breach of trust for their own
benefit and not for the benefit of the stockholders, for gross inattention and negligence by which such fraud or misconduct has been perpetrated by agents, officers or
co-directors, yet they are not liable for mistakes of judgment, even though they may
be so gross as to appear to us absurd and ridiculous, provided they are honest and
provided they are fairly within the scope of the powers and discretion confided to the
managing body.
In re Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. at 24.
The reluctance on the part of the Spering court to hold the directors to a higher duty of care
may be a reflection of the times for it would deter "gentlemen of character and responsibility"
from accepting positions as directors. The result would be disastrous because many of the earlier
banks needed the reputation of its directors to attract clients. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132,
174 (1891).
The rationale for the rule is that the courts "should not interfere with the corporation's
internal management by substituting its judgment for the board's." Soderquist, Toward a More
Effective CorporateBoard: Reexamining Roles of Outside Directors, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1341,
1346 n.29 (1977); see, e.g., Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 61 F. Supp. 905, 911 (E.D. Pa.
1945); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (dictum); Davis v. Louisville
Gas & Elec. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 169, 142 A. 654, 659 (1928); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 I1. App.
2d 173, 178, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 (1968); Helfman v. American Light & Traction Co., 121 N.J.
Eq. 1, 20, 187 A. 540, 550 (Ch. 1936). See generally Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule
Rcvisited, 8 HoS-Iras L. REv. 93 (1979); Lewis, supra note 29; Comment, The Continuing
Viability of the Business. Judgment Rule as. a Guide for Judicial Restraint. 35 CEO. WAsH. L.
REv. 562 (1967).
3" 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
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the bank's president caused the bank's insolvency by extending loans
to bad credit risks.40 In analyzing the duties of bank directors, the
court stated that such directors should be more than mere figureheads;
they "must exercise [the] ordinary care and prudence" 4' necessary
depending upon the particular circumstances involved. Bank directors
were entitled to leave much of the administration of the business to
the managing officers, whose relationship to the corporation was that
of agency. 42 A director's duty, therefore, was classified as one of
proper control over the corporation's agents, 43 but not as an "insurer
of the fidelity of [his] agents." 44 This theory relieved bank directors of
liability for losses caused by their officers unless their own negligence
precipitated the corporate loss. The court recognized that a director
could be found negligent if he became suspicious of some wrongdoing
but did nothing to stop it. A director was not required to assume the
dishonesty of his officers without reason, however. 4s Thus, the business judgment rule was applicable to a director's relationship to his
be liable if ordinary attenofficers and an honest director would only
46
tion would have uncovered the fraud.
Relating this standard of care to the facts in Briggs, the court
asserted that unless the directors were "grossly inattentive" in their
duties they should not be held liable. 47 The court then applied the
"proper diligence" standard subjectively, and found the directors who
had done virtually nothing in their positions not to be liable because
they could not have prevented the bank's insolvency. 48 What would
have constituted "grossly inattentive" to the majority is not clear and
appears to be the point of the dissent. 49 Although the dissent em40Id. at 137, 147.
Id. at 165.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 147.
44 Id.; see McConnell v. Combination Mining & Milling Co., 31 Mont. 563, 573, 79 P. 248.
251 (1905); Weidner v. Engelhart, 176 N.W. 2d 509, 518 (N.D. 1970); Selheimer v. Manganese
Corp. of America, 423 Pa. 563, 581, 224 A.2d 634, 644 (1966).
41 141 U.S. at 162.
40 Id. at 149.
47Id. at 165-66. The Court found that the bank was already insolvent at the time the
41

directors were elected to the board. Since the directors were not aware of this fact, their duty did
not extend to a thorough examination of the books to discover the bank's insolvency in the
absence of any reasonable suspicion. Id. at 154. The Court held that such an inspection would
have amounted to an "extraordinary degree of care" on the director's part. Id. at 162.
48 Id. at 152-58.
19Id. at 169 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Commentators have viewed the Briggs dissent as a
much sounder argument than that of the majority, and it is more often quoted as the correct
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1085, at
standard. See 3A W. FLECHro,
107-08 (1963); Dwight, Liability of CorporateDirectors, 17 YALE L.J. 33, 38 (1939).
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braced the same standard as the majority, it would have applied it
more objectively. The dissent found the individual qualities of the

directors and whether they could have prevented the bank's insolvency to be irrelevant to the court's analysis. 50 The mere fact that the
directors breached their duties as directors would have been sufficient
for the dissent to impose liability. 5'
Furthermore, the dissent noted that if directors were permitted
to abdicate their responsibilities, the purpose of maintaining a board

of directors would be defeated, inasmuch as creditors and stockholders
would no longer maintain confidence in the business.5 2 This reasoning of limiting director responsibility was similar to that used in
Spering's Appeal, but resulted in a different outcome. Whereas the
Spering's Appeal court reasoned that too much director responsibility
would deter men of stature from becoming directors and result in loss

of client confidence in the business, the Briggs dissent argued that too
3
little director responsibility would have much the same result.Ten years after Briggs, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Campbell v. Watson5 4 examined a situation similar to that involved in
Briggs, but held the directors liable in failing to discover improper
loans. 55 The Briggs standard of care, namely that a person must
exercise ordinary and proper care in the absence of anything arousing
suspicion, was altered in Campbell to a duty of "such care and diligence . . . as experience has shown is at once proper as well as

so141 U.S. at 166 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that these directors completely
ignored the conduct of the bank's president, who managed the business. Id. Two of the directors
had signed comptroller reports that were "false and fraudulent" without checking their accuracy. Id. at 167 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
3,Id. at 174 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
52 Id.

-5 In re Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. at 21. This fear that a higher duty would be such a
substantial threat of personal liability that the best qualified people would refuse to serve as
directors has been expressed by later courts and commentators. E.g., Smith v. Brown-Borhek
Co., 414 Pa. 325, 333, 200 A.2d 398, 401 (1964); E. MCSWEENEY, MANAGING THE MANAGERS 105,
106 (1978); Soderquist, supra note 38, at 1349-50; Symposium, The Greening of the Board
Room: Reflections on CorporateResponsibility, 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 15, 23-24 (1973)
(statement of Professor Harvey J. Coldschmid); Comment, Factors That Limit the Negligence
Liability of a Corporate Executive or Director, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 341, 343.
One commentator has suggested that in order to attract qualified directors, "workable
tasks" should be mandated, thereby avoiding the confusing duty of care standard which the law
now provides. Dent, The Revolution in CorporateCovernance, The Monitoring Board, and the
Director' Duty of Care, 61 B.U.L. REv. 623, 654 (1981).
's 62 N.J. Eq. 396, 50 A. 120 (Ch. 1901).
m Id. at 451, 50 A. at 142.
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practicable, and as is exercised by other experienced directors, and as
is required by their charter and by-laws."'56
Although this rule appeared to be similar to that in Briggs, the
Campbell court interpreted due diligence to encompass a duty on the
part of the director to inspect the books and to become familiar with
the "mode of supervision" practiced by his officers. 57 If he were
ignorant of the way affairs were managed or what the by-laws required, the director would be bound to inquire of others and acquaint
himself as to those duties. 58 In Campbell, the cashier's embezzlements could easily have been detected by a simple comparison of the
books. Because no such attempt was made by the directors, 59 they
became liable for the losses. 60 Thus, while both courts appear to have
set forth an objective standard, Briggs allowed the defendants a good
faith defense since the court believed that there was nothing the
directors could have done to prevent the bank's insolvency, whereas
Campbell applied a more stringent application of the standard and
observed that if the directors had applied even the slightest attention
to their duties, the losses could have been prevented.61
Although Campbell put forth a number of important principles,
it especially illustrates two basic concepts of directorial liability: negligence and causation. If a director were to fall below the ordinary skill
and prudence standard, he would be negligent in his duties as a
director. Because the directors in Campbell failed to inspect the bank's
books and to supervise the corrupt cashier, they were negligent because that was what an ordinary and prudent director should have
done. 62 But a director could not be held liable for corporate losses
58Id. at 426, 50

A. at 132. The court said specifically that the Briggs ruling did not reach the

Campbell case, but it did find the dissent in Briggs to be a more convincing argument. Id. at 439,
50 A. at 137.
5 Id. at 409, 50 A. at 125. The Campbell court required an inspection of the books because
there seemed to be so many dishonest officers in the banking industry who had discovered
numerous ways to steal from the company that the directors could no longer blindly trust them.
Id.
" Id. at 415-16, 50 A. at 128.
59Id. at 411, 50 A. at 128.
60Id. at 419-20, 50 A. at 130; cf. LaMonte v. Mott, 93 N.J. Eq. 229, 107 A. 462 (Ch. 1921)
(directors exonerated because they had made honest effort to perform their duty).
61 62 N.J. Eq. at 419, 50 A. at 129. But see Hun v.Cary, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880). Hun represents
the high water mark where directors were held liable for real estate investments which the bank
couldn't afford and which rendered the bank insolvent. Some commentators have noted that
Hun sets a higher standard of conduct than the average. Cary & Harris, Standardsof Conduct
Under Common Law, Present Day Statutes and the Model Act, 27 Bus. LAw. 61 (1972). One
commentator noted that the Briggs court's attitude of "good humored tolerance" as opposed to
the sternness of Hun is even more notable in light of the fact that the Briggs defendants were
bank directors, traditionally held to a stricter standard. Soderquist, supra note 38, at 1347.
02 62 N.J. Eq. at 451-53, 50 A. at 142-43.
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unless his negligence caused the losses . 3 The Campbell court held
that the directors' omissions directly caused the bank's losses, 6 because
4
if they had been diligent the losses would not have occurred.
Although Briggs and Campbell involved the liability of bank
directors, their rules are equally applicable to other corporate directors. 65 Briggs in particular has been cited more often than any other
case on this issue. 66 Traditionally bank directors have been held to a
stricter standard of care,6 7 but case law suggests that a lesser duty is
required of directors of non-banking corporations. 6 8 The trend after
the early bank cases has been an almost consistent string of victories
for non-banking directors.8 9 The courts have found either that the
director did not have knowledge of or participate in the wrongful acts
of co-directors and officers, 70 or that the plaintiff failed to prove that
7
defendant's negligence was the actual cause of the corporate losses. '
A case which exemplifies this trend is Barnes v. Andrews,72
where the director of an auto parts company was found liable for

Id. at 405, 50 A. at 124.
Id. at 420, 50 A. at 130.
11 W. FLEtrcER, supra note 49, § 1085, at 106. But see Lewis, supra note 29, at 163.
" W. FLErCIIEn, supra note 49, § 1085, at 106.
67 E.g., Gamble v. Brown, 29 F.2d 366, 370 (4th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 839
(1929); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
b8 Martin, FederalRegulation of Real Estate Investment Trusts: A Legislative Proposal, 127
U. PA. L. REv. 316, 330 (1978); Soderquist, supra note 38, at 1347. "The search for cases in
which directors of industrial corporations have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence
uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very large
haystack." Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968). Contra H. BALLANTINE,
BALLANTINE ON CoRPoRATIONS § 63a, at 161 (1946) (improbable that bank directors are held to
higher degree of care but are merely required to give reasonable attention to their affairs). See
generally W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 525-27 (4th ed.
1969); W. FLurctiEn, supra note 49, § 1068, at 84.
69 Goldstein & Shepherd, supra note 1, at 781; see, e.g., Hoehn v. Crews, 144 F.2d 665 (10th
Cir. 1944), aff'd, 324 U.S. 200 (1945); Holand v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 151 Colo.
69, 376 P.2d 162 (1962); Hathaway v. Huntley, 284 Mass. 587, 188 N.E. 616 (1933). In cases
where the courts have found directors of industrial corporations liable, the opinions suggest that
the courts suspected the "'defendants' conduct was more duplicitous than negligent." Soderquist,
supra note 38, at 1348.
7" Berman v. LeBeau Inter-America, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (director and
officer who was not allowed to participate in finances of company held not liable for payments
made in alleged gross disregard of duty).
7H Hoehn v. Crews, 144 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1944), aff'd, 324 U.S. 200 (1945) (bank directors'
failure to publish notice of liquidation was proximate cause of losses); Allied Freightways, Inc. v.
Cholfin, 325 Mass. 630, 91 N.E.2d 765 (1950) (director who could not have discovered misappropriations and who could not have stopped her husband from making such payments held not
liable).
'2 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
"'
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"misprision of office, ' 73 but was not found to have caused the corporate losses.
Judge Learned Hand, writing for the court, noted that
although directors are not expected to participate personally in the
everyday affairs of the business, they should do more than be content
with general responses from subordinates that "the business looks
promising."7 - The burden is on the plaintiff to show that if the
defendant had performed his duties the loss could have been
avoided. 76 The court noted that no evidence had been put forth by
the plaintiff to indicate that defendant's neglect was the proximate

cause of the losses. Furthermore, the amount of the loss could not be
7

ascertained .
In determining liability, the courts have been lenient with respect to directors of corporations in the absence of some form of active
mismanagement, fraud or self-dealing. 7 In Allied Freightways v.
Cholfin, 9 for instance, the receivers of a trucking business brought an
action against Mrs. Cholfin, a non-participating director of a business
operated solely by her husband, alleging that the Cholfins spent corporate funds to pay for their personal debts. 80 The court held that
Mrs. Cholfin was not responsible for her husband's actions, however,
since she did not actually participate with her husband in the cash
73 Id. at 615. Misprision of office is a failure to become more intimately involved in corporate
affairs.
74 Id. at 618. The company had lost a large amount of money due to bad business decisions
and general misadministration during the defendant's eight-month term of office. Id. at 617.
75 Id. at 616; see Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. at 166 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
78 298 F. at 616. The court iterated that if the Barnes situation had been a question of an
illegal loan, a protest by the defendant might have been sufficient to stop it. But when a
corporation such as the one in Barnes suffers from general mismanagement and/or business
incapacity, it is not possible to conclude that the actions of a single director could have prevented
the losses. Id. The court stopped short of requiring defendant to "read the circulars sent out to
prospective purchasers and test them against the facts." Id. at 620. To do so would be to require
of him a "detailed supervision of the business" which is too time-consuming and would result in
no one accepting a directorate. Id.; see note 53 supra and accompanying text.
Some commentators have referred to the Cholfin standard as requiring "gross negligence"
for director liability, as opposed to "ordinary negligence." Cf. Spiegel v. Beacon Participations.
Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 411, 8 N.E.2d 895, 904 (1937) ("clear and gross negligence" standard
controlling if director acting in good faith). See generally Martin, supra note 68. at 330. This
standard has been severely criticized. N. LATrIN, Tim LAW OF COoRaTIoNs § 78, at 274 (2d ed.
1971).
77 298 F. at 616. In discussing the directors lack of skill in the disposition of the causation
issue, Judge Hand left open the question whether lack of causation was related to the business
situation as well as to the inadequate skills of the defendants. Dyson, supra note 2, at 364 n.95.
78 Berman v. LeBeau Inter-America, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1981): W. FLETCHEn.
supra note 49, § 1349, at 632; see, e.g., Components for Research, Inc. v. Isolation Prods.. Inc..
241 Cal. App.2d 726, 729, 50 Cal. Rptr. 829, 831 (1966); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255,
282-83, 5 A.2d 503, 515 (1939); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 677-78 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
79 325 Mass. 630, 91 N.E.2d 765 (1950).
80 Id. at 631, 91 N.E.2d at 766.
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withdrawals, and might have been an "ordinary housewife with no
business experience. 's Although Mrs. Cholfin may have been under

a duty to inspect the books, the court concluded that it was unlikely
that she would have derived much information from them. Even if

she had, she probably could not have persuaded her husband to
change his course of action. 82 Although Mrs. Cholfin was negligent
in performing her duties as a director, her negligence was not the
proximate cause of the losses. Implicit in the court's ruling was the
suggestion that even if Mrs. Cholfin had been diligent, she was neither
skilled enough nor persuasive enough to have prevented the losses. 83
Thus, by analyzing the particular abilities of Mrs. Cholfin, the court
applied a subjective standard in its finding of no causation.
In an attempt to clarify the duties of directors, states began to
adopt statutes which codified common law. 84 The courts were then
left to interpret the individual statutes. One case, Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of America,8 5 was a stockholders' derivative suit in
equity brought against the directors for mismanagement of funds
resulting in a loss to the corporation. 88 Section 408 of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation law 1 7 provided that directors have a fiduciary relationship to the corporation, and that they should exercise that
degree of "diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men
would exercise under similar circumstances in their personal business
affairs." 8 8 The issue before the court was whether the directors of a
corporation who had been " imprudent, wasteful, careless, and negli-

a'

Id. at 633, 636, 91 N.E.2d at 768-69. Mrs. Cholfin was liable for misspent corporate funds
which benefitted her personally. Id.
t- Id.

81

Id. Cholfin represents the general rule, applied in a number of jurisdictions, that a
director is not liable for losses that he or she could not have prevented by being diligent. See
Goldstein & Shepherd, supra note 1, at 759 n.161; cJ. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. at 616-18
(proximate cause not established when it could not be shown that director could have prevented
collapse of business due to general mismanagement).
" G. HopnsrrUN, CORMortATION LAW AND PRAcrIcE § 433, at 530 (1959). Portions of the
Model Business Corporation Act of 1960 have been adopted by most of the fifty states. Almost all
of the states have taken the form of the New York and Pennsylvania statutes concerning duty of
care on the part of directors. Cary & Harris, supra note 61, at 64. The New York statute reads:
"Directors and officers shall discharge their duties of their respective positions in good faith and
with that degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under
similar circumstances in like positions." N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 193).
65 423 Pa. 563, 224 A. 2d 634 (1966).
86 Id. at 565-66, 224 A.2d at 636-37. Defendants poured money into a plant that they
allegedly knew was unproductive, and failed to utilize another plant. Id.
87 Act of May 5, 1933, P.L. No. 364, art. IV, § 408 (amended 1966). Within a few weeks of
the Selheimer decision, the Pennsylvania legislature struck the last five words of the statute so as
to have it read: "with that care which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar
circumstances." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408 (Purdon 1966).
a PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408 (Purdon 1966).
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gent" could be personally liable for losses that resulted in insolvency

under section 408.89 The court answered in the affirmative, noting
that the insolvency was due to gross mismanagement, the assets having shrunk from $400,000 to $30,000.90 Thus, the court interpreted
the statute as being harsher and stricter than the prevailing majority
view at the time. 9'
Against the backdrop of the early bank cases, as well as Cholfin

and the line of cases that followed, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
decided Francisv. United Jersey Bank. 2 Justice Pollock, speaking for
a unanimous court, began his discussion with the general proposition
that in order to find Mrs. Pritchard liable the court must find that
there was a duty to the corporation's customers, that there was a
breach of that duty, and that this breach was the proximate cause of
93
corporate losses.
In examining relevant case law 94 and applicable statutory law, 9 5
the Francis court found that the duty of corporate directors was "to
act as ordinarily prudent persons under similar circumstances in like
positions." ' 8 Such a standard serves as a "wellspring from which
those more specific duties flow."' 97 The duties of a corporate director
89 423 Pa. at 570, 224 A.2d at 639.
Id. at 582, 224 A.2d at 645. It is important to note that plaintiff Selheimer, who was also a
9
director of the company and a defendant, was absolved of liability because he had taken steps to
stop the actions of the directors by threatening suit and organizing a stockholder's protective
committee. Id. The court viewed the director's effort to stop co-directors from acting wrongfully
as fulfilling one's duty as a director, and, therefore, no breach occurred. See Dodd v. Wilkinson,
42 N.J. Eq. 647, 651, 9 A. 685, 687 (1887); Williams v. Riley, 34 N.J. Eq. 398, 401 (Ch. 1881).
91 423 Pa. at 573, 224 A.2d at 640. Case law prior to the statute had stated that the standard
was one of "ordinary care and diligence and that absent fraud or gross negligence amounting to
fraud, such directors would not be personally liable for their actions." Id. at 573-74, 224 A.2d at
640-41.
02 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981).
93 Id. at 28, 432 A.2d at 820. An initial determination for the court was whether or not New
Jersey law was applicable in this case despite the fact that P & B was a New York corporation.
Id. at 27, 432 A.2d at 820. The court, relying on the trial court record, held that since New
Jersey had more significant relationships to the parties and the transactions than New York. New
Jersey law should apply. Id.
Campbell v. Watson, 62 N.J. Eq. 396, 50 A. 120 (Ch. 1901).
95 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-14 (West 1969) obliges directors to "discharge their duties in
good faith and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would
exercise under similar circumstances in like positions." In analyzing duty of care, the court
examined case law prior to the enactment of the New Jersey statute. See Campbell v. Watson, 62
N.J. Eq. 396, 50 A. 120 (Ch. 1901). Because of the statute's derivation from N.Y. Bus. Conp.
LAW § 717 (McKinney 1963), the court included New York case law in its discussion. An
important aspect of section 717, noted by the court, is that it is an attempt to apply a uniform
standard to public and closely held corporations. 87 N.J. at 30, 432 A.2d at 821.
96 87 N.J. at 28, 432 A.2d at 820.
97 Id. at 31, 432 A.2d at 821. One commentator has remarked that state law serves as the
source for corporate directors' powers, but that most of a director's duties and liabilities are
derived from common law, not statutes. Goldstein & Shepherd, supra note 1, at 774.
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can be expanded or limited depending upon the special circumstances
of each case. The court observed that there are a few basic obligations
applicable to most directors. First, a director must have an elementary
understanding of the corporation's business, which would include
familiarity with business essentials.9 8 Second, a director must maintain a supervisory role to comply with the required degree of care.
Ignorance of improper activities by others is not a valid defense. 9 9
Finally, a director, while not required to inspect the daily activities of
the corporation, must attend board meetings, regularly review financial statements, and inquire, if necessary, into the affairs disclosed by
the statements.10 0 Additionally, once a director becomes aware of an
"illegal course of action," he may be under a duty to object, resign, ' 0'
or consult legal counsel.10 2 In some situations, a director may even be
03
obligated to threaten to file a lawsuit.1
In analyzing the duties that a director owes to the corporation,
the court noted that dummy or figurehead directors are "anachronisms;" hence, "all directors are responsible for managing the business
and affairs of the corporation." 0 4 Although in general directors owe
a fiduciary duty only to the corporation, the court distinguished particular corporations that may owe duties to third parties and creditors.10 5

Banks are one example in which a director owes a fiduciary

duty to depositors as creditors; another example is a non-banking
corporation which holds funds in trust. 06 In the latter group, direc"' 87 N.J. at 31, 432 A.2d at 821-22 (citing Campbell v. Watson, 62 N.J. Eq. at 416, 50 A. at
128); .seeFeuer, Liabilties of Directorsand Officers, 5 N.Y.L.F. 127, 133 (1959) (citing Barnes v.
Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1928)). See also Lewis, supra note 29, at 100.
87 N.J. at 31, 432 A.2d at 822.
J, Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 887, 890 (6th Cir. 1938); 87 N.J. at 32-33, 432 A.2d at 822
(citing Corsicana Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 2.51 U.S. 68, 71 (1919)); LaMonte v. Mott, 93 N.J. Eq.
229, 259, 107 A. 462, 467 (1921).
lul87 N.J. at 33, 432 A.2d at 823 (citing Dodd v. Wilkinson, 42 N.J. Eq. 647, 651, 9 A. 685,
687 (1887)).
I" Id. at 33-34, 432 A.2d at 823. Failure to seek legal counsel has led to a finding that
management was negligent. See, e.g., Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 658 (Sup. Ct.
1941); Lit-win v. Allen, 2.5 N.Y.S.2d 667, 699 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Vance v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 72
Tenn. 385, 391 (1880); W. Ft=rCHE, supra note 49, § 1027, at 588. See generally Hawes &
Sherrard, Reliance on Advice of Counsel as a Defense in Corporateand Securities Cases, 62 VA.
L. REv. 1 (1976).
'3 87 N.J. at 34, 432 A.2d at 823 (citing Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of America, 423 Pa. at
572, 584, 224 A.2d at 640, 646).
I"'87 N.J. at 34, 432 A.2d at 823-24; see, e.g.. Williams v. McKay, 46 N.J. Eq. 25, 18 A. 824
(Ch. 1889); Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 329 N.E.2d 180, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975);
Kavanaugh v. Gould, 223 N.Y. 103, 119 N.E. 237 (1918); Campbell v. Watson, 62 N.J. Eq. 396,
50 A. 120 (Ch. 1901).
I'l87 N.J. at 36, 432 A.2d at 824. The court noted that directors do not have a duty to
creditors in the absence of insolvency. Id.
I" Id.
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tors have traditionally not been held liable if they did not actively
participate in converting the trust funds of a corporation or know of
the activity. 0 7 The Francis court specifically rejected this contention, 108 stating that directors of corporations holding funds in trust
owe a particular duty to its beneficiaries similar tothat which is owed
to depositors by a bank director. The beneficiary can expect that a
corporate director in his fiduciary capacity will act with "ordinary
prudence" in relation to the funds. 0 9
Consequently, the court, viewing Pritchard & Baird as a reinsurance broker, made the following conclusions: First, that Pritchard &
Baird was analogous to a bank because it held millions of dollars in
trust for other companies; second, that Mrs. Pritchard's relationship to
her clients was equivalent to that of a bank director with respect to his
depositors; third, that since the misappropriated funds were held in
an implied trust, the trust relationship between Mrs. Pritchard and
her clients produced a "fiduciary duty to guard the funds with fidelity
and good faith;" and fourth, that the customers of Pritchard & Baird
could reasonably presume that Mrs. Pritchard, being a fiduciary director, would not have permitted or ratified the commingling and
conversion of insurance proceeds." 0
Applying the foregoing analysis, the court found that Mrs. Pritchard had breached her duty as a director on several grounds: she
should have known that Pritchard & Baird held millions of dollars for
other companies; she should have read the company's financial statements;"' and she should have made attempts to ferret out or prevent
the illegal acts of her co-directors." 2 Although she had a right to rely
on the content of the financial statements, " 3 she should not be excused

t07Id. at 36-37, 432 A.2d at 824-25; accord, Berman v. LeBeau Inter-America, Inc., 509 F.
Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Taylor v. Alston, 79 N.M. 643, 447 P.2d 523 (1968).
108 87 N.J. at 37, 432 A.2d at 825. In so holding, the court overruled three New Jersey cases to
the extent that the cases support the proposition that directors are not liable unless they actively
participate in the conversion of trust funds: Ark-Tenn Distrib. Corp. v. Breidt, 209 F.2d 359 (3d
Cir. 1954); General Films, Inc. v. Sanco Gen. Mfg. Corp., 153 N.J. Super. 369, 379 A.2d 1042
(App. Div. 1977); McGlynn v. Schultz, 90 N.J. Super. 505, 218 A.2d 408 (Ch. Div. 1966). affd.
95 N.J. Super. 412, 231 A.2d 386 (App. Div. 1967), certif. denied, 50 N.J. 409, 235 A.2d 901
(1967); see note 146 infra.
10987 N.J. at 37, 432 A.2d at 825. Justice Pollock observed that the fiduciary duty which the
court recognized for those directors of corporations holding funds in trust was another "application of the general rule that a director's duty is that of an ordinary prudent person under the
circumstances." Id.
110Id. at 38, 432 A.2d at 825.
"I Id.
112 Id. at 39, 432 A.2d at 826.
13 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-14 (West 1968) provides:
[D]irectors shall not be liable if acting in good faith, they rely upon the opinion of
counsel for the corporation or upon written reports setting forth financial data
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face that her sons were
from liability because they revealed on their
4
essentially stealing from the corporation."
Concluding its analysis, the court focused on the issue of causation. Although Mrs. Pritchard was held to be negligent in her duty as
a director, the court observed that such negligence does not necessarily
make her liable for corporate losses unless her act or failure to act was
a proximate cause of such losses."15 The court iterated that Mrs.
Pritchard could only be held liable upon a showing by plaintiff that

specific losses were incurred and that these losses could have been
prevented had the director performed her duty."16 The court's discussion of proximate cause was the key element of the case because
directors similarly situated to Mrs. Pritchard have usually been held to
have breached their duty of care, but have not been held liable for
losses as a result of that breach."17
Because the instant case involved an act of nonfeasance, the

court's analysis focused on the "reasonable steps" Mrs. Pritchard
should have taken and whether or not performance of those steps
would have succeeded in avoiding the loss.' 1 8 Her duties were defined by the critical financial condition of Pritchard & Baird and the
special fiduciary relationship which the corporation had to its clients.

The parameters of these duties comprised all reasonable courses of
concerning the corporation . . . or upon financial statements, books of account or
reports of the corporation represented to them to be correct by the president, the
officer of the corporation having charge of its books of account.
Id.; see Dent, supra note 53, at 649.
'"
87 N.J. at 38, 432 A.2d at 82,5-26. The financial statements from January 31, 1970 and
onward reveal that the "shareholder's loans" and working capital deficits were metastisizing at a
rapid rate. A superficial reading of the statement by anyone would have revealed that the sons
were "bleeding" the corporation to death. Id. at 39, 432 A.2d at 826.
11 Id.
Id. (citing G. HORNSrEIN, supra note 84, § 446, at 566) The burden of proving a director's
I'
lack of due diligence is on the plaintiff. PRINCIPLES OF CoRPoRaTE GOVERNANCE AND SRUCrUE:
RESTATEMENT AND RtCOMMENDATIONS § 4.01, comment b (1982) (tentative draft No. 1).
",, See, e.g., Allied Freightways v. Cholfin, 325 Mass. 630, 91 N.E.2d 765 (1950). The court
distinguished Mrs. Pritchard's situation from that of the director in Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F.
614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). The director in Barnes was exonerated even though he had breached his
duty as a director due to "general mismanagement, business incapacity or bad judgment." Id. at
616-17. In such a case, it was impossible for a plaintiff to prove what specific losses could have
been avoided if the director had performed his duty. Barnes distinguished between general
mismanagement cases and cases in which a director failed to stop an "illegal loan," inferring that
liability should be imposed on the latter. 87 N.J. at 41, 432 A.2d at 827.
Plaintiffs have rarely been able to prove proximate cause in the absence of board approval of
definite transactions. Because directors have been traditionally required to do very little, proof
that their breach has led to an identifiable loss is difficult. Proof of proximate cause has
"weakened the director's duty of care." Dent, supra note 53, at 652.
Generally, courts have distinguished between misfeasance and nonfeasance, holding directors personally liable for fraud, self-dealing or active mismanagement, while hardly ever doing
so for a director's failure to direct. Soderquist, supra note 38, at 1346.
"1 87 N.J. at 40, 432 A.2d at 826.
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action to stop the misappropriation of funds." 9 The most likely
action she could have taken would have been to object and resign, but
the court said that even if she had, she still would have been held
liable. The court found two reasons for so concluding. First, Mrs.
Pritchard did not resign until immediately prior to the bankruptcy,
thus, there was no factual support for the proposition that if she had
objected and resigned the losses would not have occurred. Second,
because of the character of the reinsurance business, it is distinguishable from other kinds of corporations in that reinsurance brokers owe
20
fiduciary duties to third parties, not just to shareholders.1
Therefore, Mrs. Pritchard had a duty to do more than object and
resign.12 1 She had a duty to consult counsel and to threaten the
corporation with a lawsuit. 22 According to the court, her conduct
was a proximate cause of the conversion of trust funds because her
negligence was a "substantial factor contributing to the loss.123 Because her sons knew that she was neither examining their conduct nor
reviewing the financial statements, they were able to "spawn their
fraud in the backwater of her neglect.'

124

Mrs. Pritchard was held

personally liable as a matter of law because her negligence contributed to a "climate of corruption" which was allowed to continue
25
because she failed in her duties as a director.
The Francis holding which imposes personal liability on a director for the conversion of trust funds when the director has neither
participated in the illegal act nor been aware of its existence, reflects
the New Jersey Supreme Court's efforts to deter the practice of figurehead directors. Even in light of the well established principle that
figurehead directors should not be afforded protection,

26

most courts

still have been inconsistent in finding such directors liable. 2 7 The
"1
Id. at 41, 432 A.2d at 827. Directors have a duty to -make reasonable inquiry when acting
upon corporate transactions." PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCrURE: RESTATE-

MENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(b) (1982)
120 87 N.J. at 40-41, 432 A.2d at 827.

(tentative draft No. 1).

Id. at 45, 432 A.2d at 829.
Id. The court is in agreement with some commentators who propose that reliance on
counsel should satisfy the "modicum of diligence" required under the business judgment rule,
absent bad faith and self-dealing. Hawes & Herrard, supra note 102, at 42.
123 87 N.J. at 44, 432 A.2d at 829 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442B, comment b
(1966)). Prosser states that "[l]egal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so
closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing
121
122

liability." W. PfossER,

HANDBOOK OF TIlE LAW OF

Totrrs § 41, at 237 (4th ed. 1971).

124 87 N.J. at 44, 432 A.2d at 829.
12-5 Id.

126 87 N.J. at 34, 432 A.2d at 823. The court labeled such figurehead directors "anachronisms

with no place in New Jersey law." Id.; see note 104 supra and accompanying text. See also
Campbell v. Watson, 62 N.J. Eq. at 443, 50 A. at 139; Williams v. McKay, 46 N.J. Eq. 25, 5758, 18 A. at 836 (Ch. 1889).
127 Soderquist, supra note 38, at 1346.
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inconsistency stems from whether a court uses a subjective or an
objective standard to determine a director's duty of care to the corporation and the proximate causation of his negligence to the corporate
28
losses. 1
29
The Franciscourt apparently applied a reasonable director test'
to reinsurance directors, which is similar to the objective standard
applicable to directors of banking institutions. 3 0 In utilizing this test,
the court drew an analogy between banks and reinsurance brokers.
This analogy is possible because New Jersey statutory law' 3 ' and case
law'

32

allow the court to consider similarities of responsibilities as-

sumed by directors in different industries in its determination of liability. 133 The analogy is necessary because application of an objective
34
test has failed to impose a duty on directors towards their creditors.'
Francisovercomes this problem by finding that a reinsurance broker's
director has a duty to creditors just as banks owe a duty to their
depositors. 3 5
The issue of proximate causation arises primarily in cases of
omission.' 3 Francis and Cholfin represent similar factual circumstances with divergent results.' 37 Although Mrs. Cholfin was found
', Which standard to apply has been the question that divides most of the cases on director
liability. W. FLErcEE, supra note 49, § 1065, at 106; Dyson, supra note 2, at 362.
"w Actually, the "reasonable director" test was first articulated in Briggs v. Spaulding, 141
U.S. 132 (1891), as "the degree of care to which these [directors] were bound is that which
ordinarily prudent and diligent men would exercise under similar circumstances and in determining that the restrictions of the statute and the usages of business should be taken into
account." Id. at 152. Although the test is an objective one, the court exonerated the Briggs
directors because there was no proximate causation. Other courts have adopted a similar
standard. See. e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 84, 188 A.2d 125, 130
(1963): Department of Banking v.Calburn, 188 Neb. 500, 504-05, 198 N.W.2d 69, 73 (1972);
Syracuse Television, Inc. v. Channel 9, Syracuse, Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 188, 196, 273 N.Y.S.2d 16,
27 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Planters Corp., 236 S.C. 318, 328, 114
S.E.2d 321, 326 (1960); W. FsLrcim, supra note 49, § 1038, at 34-35. This standard is
embodied in several statutes. E.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:91 (West 1969); N.Y. Bus. CoRP.
LAW § 717 (McKinney 1963); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.34(b) (West 1953). Briggs has been
criticized "for the reason that it lays down fair rules and then proceeds to look at the whole
matter from the viewpoint of the individual directors." W. FLETCHER, supra note 49, § 1085, at
107-08.
130 87 N.J. at 36, 432 A.2d at 824.
'"' N.J. STAT. ANN. §14A:6-14 (West 1969); see note 96 supra.

,. 87 N.J. at 28, 432 A.2d at 820; see note 95 supra.

,n 87 N.J. at 31, 432 A.2d at 821.
134Id. at 36, 432 A.2d at 824 (citing Whitfield v. Kern, 122 N.J. Eq. 332, 342, 345, 192 A. 48,
54, 55 (1937)).
"a 87 N.J. at 36, 432 A.2d at 824.
'I" Id. at 40, 432 A.2d at 826. See also Dyson, supra note 2, at 361-64, 373-74.
, Both involved a housewife whose family members controlled the company's funds and
misappropriated them without the knowledge of their co-directors. Both were negligent as
directors, and yet, only Mrs. Pritchard was found to be the proximate cause of the company's
losses. 87 N.J. at 45, 432 A.2d at 833.
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to have been negligent as a director, she was not held liable because
her omissions were not the proximate cause of the losses. 138 In assessing proximate cause, the Cholfin court applied a subjective standard 39 by looking at the particular qualities of the individual director
to see if she could have changed the co-directors' actions. If Mrs.
Cholfin could have stopped the wrongdoing, a causal link would be
40
established and she would be held liable as a director. 1
Although the Franciscourt gave an aura of subjectivity to the
law by indicating that the particular facts of each case must be
considered, it would be far-reaching to suggest that Francis used the
same subjective standard as Cholfin. Instead of asking whether a
reasonable person with Mrs. Pritchard's qualities could have pre-

vented the losses, the Francis court asked whether a reasonable director similarly situated could have discovered the conversion and taken
adequate steps to prevent it. By invoking an objective standard,' 4 '

Francishas initiated a trend toward holding directors responsible for a
higher standard of care regardless of their personal skills. Also, under
Francis, a director has a duty to threaten the corporation with a
2
By expanding
lawsuit, if necessary, to deter the wrongful actions. 14
the responsibilities of directors through an increased duty of care, the
number of directors found liable should increase. Conversely, however, if Francisclears the boardroom of figurehead directors, thereby
elevating the quality of directors, fewer may be found liable.

136 Cholfin, 325 Mass. at 635, 91 N.E.2d at 768-69; see note 83 supra.

119This standard has been adopted by several courts. E.g., McDonnell v. American Leduc
Petroleums, Ltd., 491 F.2d 380, 383 (2d Cir. 1974); Phoenix Say. & Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 427 F.2d 862, 868 (4th Cir. 1970); Bellis v. Thal, 373 F. Supp. 120, 123 (E.D. Pa.
1974), affd mem., 510 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1975); Nanfitor v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp.
240, 244 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd, 473 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1973); Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F.
1969).
Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 711 (N.D. I11.
The test has been criticized as allowing a court "'to indulge in subjective considerations in
assessing director liability." Adkins & Janis, Some Observations on Liabilities of Corporate
Directors, 20 Bus. LAW. 817, 820 (1965). See also Note, Liability of Directors to Shareholdersfor
Negligence under American Law and their Indemnification. 16 McGILL L.J. 323, 336-37 (1970).
240 In contrast, Mrs. Cholfin's omission was not a cause of the losses because her husband
would have acted as he did whether his wife was diligent or not. 325 Mass. at 633, 91 N.E.2d at
768. Mrs. Pritchard's negligence was found to be the proximate cause of the losses because she
could have stopped her sons from what they were doing. 87 N.J. at 45, 432 A.2d at 833. Also, she
should have known that the financial statements showed on their face the corporations status.
and the court does not consider it a matter of special expertise or diligence in requiring her to do
so. Id. at 38, 432 A.2d at 825. In Cholfin, however, the court did not think Mrs. Cholfin was
skilled enough in accounting to learn anything from the company's books. 325 Mass. at 633. 91
N.E.2d at 768.
14 See note 129 supra.
142 87 N.J. at 45, 432 A.2d at 833.
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NOTES

The Francis court stated that whether or not a situation would
require a director to threaten a lawsuit against co-directors would
"best be left to case-by-case determinations.' ' 43 The effect of Francis
on non-banking corporations would then be limited, for these corporations generally owe no duty to creditors. 4 4 In effect, by distinguishing a reinsurance corporation from other non-banking corporations the court may have narrowed its holding to the reinsurance
industry exclusively, and the Francis facts particularly.' 45 Support
for this view draws strength from a possible motive the court may
have had in holding Mrs. Pritchard liable. No matter which standard
was applied, the court may have sought to find Mrs. Pritchard liable
so as to hold liable the actual wrongdoer, Charles Pritchard, Sr. It
was he who initiated the practice of taking corporate funds for personal use and who had appointed his wife as a director without
informing her of the duties involved. Indeed, it was his negligence as a
director that was the proximate cause of the corporate losses, and
since Mrs. Pritchard inherited her husband's estate the court may have
been indirectly imposing liability on the real tortfeasor.
Whether or not the Francisdecision will affect non-trust related
corporations is not clear. The court does, however, explicitly overrule
New Jersey case law which held that for directors to be liable, they
must "actively participate in the conversion of trust funds."'

46

Fur-

"' Id. The courts have always argued that negligence is a "question of fact to be determined
under all the circumstances." This approach gives courts great leeway in determining what
circumstances are significant and relevant. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. at 15; Soderquist,
supra note 38, at 1346; see Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
14
87 N.J. at 36, 432 A.2d at 824.
145 The court frequently noted throughout its opinion that a determination of Mrs. Pritchard's
duty was influenced by the special characteristics of the reinsurance industry, especially the fact
that the corporation closely resembled a bank. Id. at 36, 432 A.2d at 824.
116Id. at 37, 432 A.2d at 825. The Francis court overruled three New Jersey cases to the extent
that they held liable nominal directors who actively participated in wrongdoing.
In Ark-Tenn Distribution Corp. v. Breidt, 209 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1954), plaintiff and
defendant director's corporations had entered into a contract in which the latter would supply
vending machines to the former for $5 a machine. Plaintiff gave defendant $5,000 to be held in
trust during the period of the agreement, and defendants were to deduct $5 for each machine
and return the remaining money to plaintiffs. Defendants defaulted on the contract and plaintiffs obtained a judgment to recover the remaining portion of the fund, $4,875. Id. at 360. The
lower court held that the $5,000 fund was held in trust, that a conversion occurred when
plaintiffs' funds were commingled with other corporate assets of defendants, and that Harry
Breidt as president was a "dummy officer" of Vendors, who did not participate in the company's
operation and had no knowledge of the conversion or any opportunity to discover it. Jacob
Breidt, as treasurer, however, was directly liable for the losses because he was in control of the
company's operations. Id.
In McGlynn v. Schultz, 90 N.J. Super. 505, 218 A.2d 408 (Ch. Div. 1966), aff'd, 95 N.J.
Super. 412, 231 A.2d 386 (App. Div. 1967), certif. denied, 50 N.J. 409, 235 A.2d 901 (1967), the
court found one of the directors of the publicly-held corporation not liable because he lived out of
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thermore, the court acknowledged that the New Jersey statute which
was modeled on a New York statute was intended to effectuate a

uniform standard for all corporations. 147 Thus, it can be said that
Francis conveys a message to corporate directors in general that all
reasonable efforts must be made to stop co-director wrongdoing. Unfortunately, Francis offers little guidance for directors as to what that
standard of reasonableness entails.
MargaretA. Wilson

state and was not present at any of the directors' meetings. Citing Ark-Tenn, the court noted that
he did not exercise any of the functions normally reserved to directors, nor was he in a position to
know the intimate details of the corporation's business. Id. at 509. 218 A.2d at 411. Despite the
fact that the remaining defendant-directors relied on the advice of counsel in failing to segregate
funds, the court found that their good faith defense was not sufficient in a conversion action. Id.
at 519. The court held the remaining directors liable on the theory that any officer or director
who actually participated by aiding, instigating or assisting in a conversion of trust funds was
liable. Id. at 527.
In General Films, Inc. v. Sanco Gen. Mfg. Corp., 153 N.J. Super. 369, 379 A.2d 1042
(App. Div. 1977), defendant corporation was a broker of plastic materials and its directors were
a husband and wife, the latter being the sole stockholder. The Company received a sum of
money from plaintiffs to purchase materials, but the materials were unavailable and were never
sent. The husband, however, subsequently used the money to pay personal expenses. Plaintiffs
sued for the return of the full amount and the court, employing an implied trust theory, found
the husband liable for the losses, while exonerating his wife on the grounds that she was a
"figurehead" director, and not liable unless she actively participated in the conversion. Id. at
372, 379 A.2d at 1044.
14 87 N.J. at 30, 432 A.2d at 821; see note 95 supra.

